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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE LAW wREv w-With this issue, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW
REvIEw enters a new course, which it is hoped will be of service to
the lawyers of North Carolina, to law students and to all interested
in the legal development of this State. Wi hope that THE LAW
REv Ew will continue to prove interesting to many readers outside
of North Carolina, as it touches upon problems that are not limited
by state lines. But it is certain that the majority of readers will be
North Carolina lawyers, and much of the material in THE LAW
REVIEW will have a connection with North Carolina legal problems.
There will be articles of general interest to the legal profession every-
where, there will be discussions of particular topics of law and crit-
ical comments on current legislation and on recent decisions of our
own and other courts of last resort. If THE LAW REVIEW can be
of any help to practising lawyers and to others interested in the law,
by analyzing and explaining the changes reflected in judicial decis-
ions and legislation, it will render a sufficient service to justify its
existence.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The first issue of THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW appeared
in June 1922, and it has been published quarterly since that time on
a subscription basis. But it was not reaching all the lawyers in this
State, as had been expected, and so was not rendering such service
as we believe it can. The present plan, as long as it can be main-
tained, is to place on the subscription list, without charge, every law-
yer in North Carolina who is interested enough to request us to send
him THE LAW REVIEW. In order to do this, the size of our maga-
zine was reduced, but it is intended to keep up the standard of the
material which will appear in our pages.
We hope that THE LAW REVIEW will be the medium through
which may be expressed the attitude, the needs and the problems of
the lawyers and judges in active practice. Those who are daily
carrying on the legal work of the State must have some definite
reactions to, and also constructive suggestions for dealing with, the
difficulties met in the practical administration of justice through law.
Contacts between the lawyer, the judge, the law student and the law
teacher are needed in order that there be a basis for the legal pro-
fession as a whole to render real public service. Such coperation
we hope to have with THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW.
REASONABLE USE OF PERCOLATING WATERS-It is one of the
elementary truths, firmly fixed in the Common Law, that the water
of a natural watercourse is not the subject of ownership.' In this
respect, it may be classified with light, air, or ferae naturae, which
are not private property until appropriated, used, or reduced to con-
trol.2  Thus, while the landowner through, or past, whose premises
the watercourse runs may take it from the stream and into his pos-
session by introducing it into a pipe or aqueduct, or by storing it in
a reservoir,3 and thus acquire ownership as of personal property,4 in
its original state in the watercourse he is regarded as merely having
the use of, and not an absolute property right in, the water. He is
'Tracey Development Co. v. People, (1914) 212 N. Y. 488, 106 N. E. 330.
See also article by Samuel C. Wiel in 22 H. L. R. 190.
' Vernon Irrigation Co. v. Los Angeles, (1895) 106 Cal. 237, 39 Pac. 76Z
The Institutes of Justinian recognized running water as common property:
"Thus, the following things are by natural law common to all-the air, run-
ning water, the sea, and consequently the sea shore." Just. lib. II, tit. I,-
translation by J. B. Moyle (5th Ed.) p. 35.
'City of Syracuse v. Stacey, (1901) 169 N. Y. 231, 62 N. E. 354, Wallace v.
City of Winfield, (1916) 98 Kansas 651, 159 Pac. 11.
"Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. McMurry, (1911) 16 N. Mex. 172, 113 Pac.
823.
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entitled to demand, as a "natural right," that upper and adjoining
landowners allow the stream to flow as it has been accustomed to
flow, but, since those owners have the same right, he is under a
corresponding duty not to interfere with such flow in a manner
which might jeopardize their interests.5 Such is the doctrine of
riparian rights at Common Law in England, and as adopted by the
courts of this country.
In the case of percolating water, i.e. water percolating or seeping
through the earth under the surface and in no fixed channels, the
approach of our courts has been somewhat different. Just how far
one landowner may go in preventing the passage of such water to
adjoining land has been the subject of much discussion, and has
resulted in a wide split of authority in the various American juris-
dictions.0 In general the authorities may be marshalled under two
main heads: First, those which give to the landowner the absolute
property in percolating water, together with the right to prevent its
passage to adjoining land, and, second, those which deny such
property right; supplying, in its stead, the doctrine of reasonable use.
The first of these two positions has been termed the "English View,"
the leading case in point being Acton v. Blundell,7 which was decided
by the Exchequer Chamber in 1843. In that case, the defendant
while carrying on mining operations on his own land in the usual
manner, sunk certain shafts which drained the percolating water
from the land of the plaintiff, resulting in the drying up of the
plaintiff's well. The court held that the injury was damnum absque
injuria, following literally the maxim of cuius est solum, eius est
usque ad caelum et ad inferos,-the owner of the soil is owner to
the sky and the depths,--"whether it (the land below his property)
is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth, or part soil, part
water *"8 By its decision, the English court recognized that,
in the case of percolating water, not only the right of user, but the
corpus of the water, passed as absolute property with the soil itself.
'Goddard, Easements, (8th. Ed.) p. 84. See also Leake, Uses and Profits
of Land, p. 148. The obligation to allow the water to flow in its natural state
became a part of the Common Law under the maxim, Aqua currit et debet
currere ut currere solebat.
"For discussion and citation of cases in the various jurisdictions, see
Tiffany, Real Property, (2nd. Ed.) p. 1175 et seq. Also 27 R. C. L. ("Waters")
par. 91.
'12 Meeson & Welsby 324. See Chasetnore v. Richards, 7 H of L Cas.
349, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 729, and note.
'Acton v. Blundell, supra, p. 353.
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Numerically, perhaps over one-half of the decisions on the ques-
tion in the United States have followed the lead of Acton v. Blundell
in declaring that the landowner has an absolute property in the water
under his land, and may use it as he sees fit, irrespective of the
hardship to adjoining landowners.9 The courts supporting this view
have taken the position that the percolating water is a part of the
corpus of the soil itself, and not a separate substance subject to
riparian rights, or to the rules of use applied in the case of water in
watercourses on the surface of the land. Opposed to the line of
authorities supporting the English view is an ever-growing group
of decisions in favor of the "American Doctrine"'10 of reasonable
use. A definition of reasonable use was made by one court as fol-
lows: "While the owner of land is entitled to appropriate subter-
ranean or other waters accumulating on his land, which thereby
become a part of the realty, he cannot extract and appropriate them
in excess of a reasonable and beneficial use upon the land he owns,
unconnected with a beneficial use of the land, especially if such use
in excess of the reasonable and beneficial use is injurious to others
who have substantial rights to the water."" A great majority of
the later American cases are in accord, 12 although the Supreme
Court of Virginia, as late as 1921, followed the English View.
1 3
In the recent case of Rouse v. City of Kinston,14 the facts were
these: The plaintiff, a resident of Kinston, purchased two tracts of
land known as the "Caswell Lodge Plantation" and the "Ginhouse"
tract. On both of these properties the water was bad, being both
'Hanson v. McCue, (1871) 42 Cal. 303, 10 Am. Rep. 299; Houston &
T. C. R. Co. v. East, (1904) 98 Tex. 146, 81 S. W. 279; Roath v. Driscoll,
(1850) 20 Conn. 533, 52 Am. Dec. 352 and note; Elster v. City of Springfield,
(1892) 49 Ohio St. 82, 30 N. E. 274; Hunte v. Larainie, (1919) 26 Wyo. 160,
181 Pac. 137; Huber v. Merkel, (1903) 117 Wis. 355, 94 N. W. 354; Chase v.
Silverstone, (1873) 62 Me. 175, 16 Am. Rep. 419; Stoner v. Patten, (1909)
132 Ga. 178, 63 S. E. 897; Lybe's Appeal, (1884) 106 Pa. St. 627, 51 Am. Rep.
542; McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., (1906) 70 N. J. Eq. 695, 65 Atl.
489.
" So called, perhaps, because the English Common Law Doctrine remains
substantially unchanged. See English v. Metropolitan Water Board, (1907)
1 K. B. 588.
UMidway Irrigation Co. v. Snake Creek Mining & Tel. Co., (1921) 271
Fed. 157, 162. (CCA. 8th. Circuit).
U Smith v. Brooklyn, (1899) 160 N. Y. 357, 54 N. E. 787; Home v. Utah
Oil Refining Co., (1921) 59 Utah 279, 202 Pac. 815; Katz v. Walkinshaw,
(1902) 141 Cal. 116, 70 Pac. 663,-rehearing affirming same (1903) 141 Cal.
128, 74 Pac. 766. Wiel on Water Rights in Western States, section 1066 and
cases cited.
U Heninger v. McGinnis, (1921) 131 Va. 70, 108 S. E. 671. Also in accord
is Miller v. Black Rock Springs Imp. Co., (1901) 99 Va. 747, 40 S. E. 27.
14Rouse v. City of Kinston, (1924) 188 N. C. 1, 123 S. E. 482.
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unhealthy and not drinkable. After purchasing the land, which com-
prised almost six hundred acres, the plaintiff, at the expense of from
$15,000 to $20,000, sank wells and procured deep artesian water on
the premises. The City of Kinston purchased a half acre of land
adjoining the large tracts of the plaintiff, and soon after began sink-
ing deep wells thereon, and expressed its purpose to conduct water
therefrom by a ten-inch main to the City. Contemporaneously with
the sinking of the City's wells, two of the plaintiff's wells ceased to
flow, and the flow of a third well was decreased from approximately
100 gallons per minute to only 8 gallons per minute. The City had
also laid mains over the land of the plaintiff without purchase of an
easement or condemnation of the property. The plaintiff was
awarded $8,000 damages for the injury to his wells and $1,000 for
the trespass caused by the laying of the mains. The defendant City
nssigned error, and appealed to the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina. The court found no error, and affirmed the judgment below.
The opinion of the court was given by Clarkson, J., who, after an
exhaustive review of the authorities, rejected the English View, and
upheld the American doctrine of reasonable use of percolating water.
Said the court, "We think there is no error in the charge of the
court below as follows: 'This rule (that of reasonable use) does not
prevent the private use by any landowner of percolating waters
subjacent to his soil in manufacturing, agriculture, irrigation, or
otherwise; nor does it prevent any reasonable development of his
land by mining, or the like, although by such use the underground
percolating waters of his neighbor may be thus interfered with or
diverted; but it does prevent the withdrawal of underground waters
for sale or distribution, for uses not connected with any beneficial
ownership or enjoyment of the land froin which they are taken, if
it thereby follows that the owner of adjacent lands is interfered
with in his right to the reasonable use of subsurface water upon his
own land or if his wells, springs or streams are thereby materially
diminished in flow, or his land rendered less valuable for agricul-
ture, pasturage, or for legitimate uses. . . '." The court expressed
the opinion that the English Rule, dependent upon ownership to the
sky and depths, must fall before the maxim of sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas.15
'The same result, on substantially the same facts, was reached in the case
of Meeker v. City of East Orange, (1909) 77 N. J. Law 623, 74 Atl. 379.
There it was held that a city which, for purpose of supplying its inhabitants
with drinking water, sank on its land artesian wells, through which it drew
out percolating water, was liable in damages for injuries caused thereby to
the adjoining owner.
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As suggested in the quotation from the charge in the lower court
in the Kinston case, the application of the doctrine of reasonable use
is tempered by a close analysis of the facts to determine whether or
not the adjoining landowner is actually suffering an injury. This is
well brought out by two recent cases of Home v. Utah Oil Refining
Company16 and Glover v. Utah Oil Refining Company.17 In the
first case, over a hundred lots were irrigated by underground waters
raised from an artesian basin. An oil company purchased a small
lot in the vicinity and sunk wells whose operation seriously dimin-
ished the supply of the adjacent lot owners. The water so taken
was to be put through a refinery in the district. The surrounding
lot owners asked for an injunction, which was granted. The court,
in its opinion, rested the result solely on the ground that there had
been an unreasonable use of the percolating water on the part of
the Company. The Company then purchased the water rights of
over a hundred of the adjoining owners, and went ahead with its
original plan. Then, in the Glover case which followed, one small
lot owner, who had not sold out to the Company, asked for an
injunction. She alleged that, when all of the original lot owners
had used, on their lots in the district, their correlative portion of the
percolating waters, she was entitled to 6.58 minute gallons for her
lot; that, if the water intended to be drawn from the land by the
Company which had purchased the rights of her neighbors were
distributed rateably among all of the lots in the district, the plaintiff
would be entitled to 15 minute gallons, and that she needed the
increase over her original 6.58 minute gallons, which she admits the
defendant's action would not impair. The plaintiff sought to enjoin
the drawing of the water from the district on theory that it was not
to be beneficially used for the tract on which the artesian basin was
located. The Utah court held that, in such a case, as long as plain-
tiff's relative portion of 6.58 minute gallons was not interfered with,
she had no cause for complaint merely on the basis of the use which
the Company was to have for the water. The two cases taken
together form an excellent basis for the sugegstion contained in the
charge to the jury in the case of Rouse v. City of Kinston, that per-
haps the doctrine of reasonable use has no application unless, by a
use unconnected with the land from which the water is taken, the
adjoining landowner is interfered with in the then beneficial use of
(1921) 59 Utah 279, 202 Pac. 815.
11 (1923) 62 Utah 174, 218 Pac. 955. Thurman, J., delivered the opinion
of the court in both this case and the Homer Case, supra.
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his premises. If such a conclusion is not sound, then it would
appear that the position taken by the Utah court in the Glover case
is untenable, since in the Home case, the court rejected the idea of
absolute property in the percolating water, resting its decision solely
on the ground of unreasonable use, and then, in the sequel case,
denied the plaintiff's right to a recovery, not on the ground that the
use of the water by the Company was reasonable, but on the ground
that the plaintiff's original share of the water was not diminished.
The two Utah cases raise an interesting question with regard to
the future development of the doctrine of reasonable itse: When the
activity of the defendant fails to impair the present flow of the
percolating water through the land of the plaintiff, but will result in
cutting off the possibility of future improvements, will the courts
extend the doctrine of reasonable use so as to protect such future
development? Three separate situations are possible when the
defendant is taking percolating water,--First, he may be taking it
for use on his own land for purpose of immediate enjoyment of the
land; second, he may be taking it for use in expansion or develop-
ment of the resources of the land; and third, he may be taking the
water for use at a distant place, or for a use totally unconnected
with his own land from which it is drawn. It is quite obvious from
a portion of the charge to the jury in the Kinston case, approved by
the Supreme Court, that our court is unwilling to apply the reasonable
use doctrine so as to interfere in the first of these situations. The
present right to beneficial use of the water on the land of the person
drawing the same appears to be paramount to the right of his neigh-
bor to future increase in his supply.' 8 The inference of the charge
in that same case is that the doctrine of reasonable itse will also
permit the unrestricted use of the water in the second situation, i.e.
for future development of the defendant's land.' 9 But the court was
of the opinion that the application of the doctrine would restrain the
unrestricted use of the water by the defendant in the third of these
situations,-for use unconnected with the beneficial use of the
adjoining land from which it was drawn. The California court has
' See previously quoted portion of the charge: "This rule does not pre-
vent the private use by any landowner of percolating waters subjacent to his
soil in manufacturing, agriculture, irrigation, or otherwise .
"Ibid.: "Nor does it prevent any reasonable development of his land by
mining, or the like, although by such use the underground percolating waters
of his neighbor may be thus interfered with or diverted; . . .
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likewise taken this position, 2 0 -one which would have been fatal
to the contention of the defendant company in the Glover case had
the Utah court seen fit to adopt it.
Although the decision in the Kinston case did not render their
consideration necessary, in future applications of the doctrine of
reasonable use there are two possibilities. Either our courts will
apply the doctrine narrowly, and thus tend to swing back to the
English Rule of ownership of the percolating water, at least for all
purposes connected with the land of the person drawing the same,
21
or they will apply the doctrine broadly and limit it, roughly, to the
same considerations which now apply to riparian rights on surface
streams. The scarcity of ground water for purposes of irrigation
and the supplying of drinking water alike, make the latter course by
far the more desirable. Its adoption would mean a recognition of
the right of each adjoining landowner to have percolating water flow
as it has been accustomed to flow, free from unreasonable inter-
ference by the neighboring owners for any purpose. While the
rules of riparian rights do not, because of the difference in subject
matter, of necessity control underground waters, still it would
undoubtedly clarify the doctrine of reasonable use to attach it to
such a well-grounded and stable body of law as has arisen in
connection with water rights on the surface.
F. S. R.
Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., (1908) 154 Cal. 428, 98 Pac. 260.
The court held that the right of a landowner to a quantity of percolating water
necessary for further use on his own tract is paramount to that of the adjoin-
ing owner to take the water to distant land.
' The language of the Federal Court in Midway Irrigation Co. v. Snake
Creek Mining, etc. Co., supra, tends to support this possibility even though the
decision, perhaps, does not. See p. 162 of that opinion: "Subterranean and
other waters on his land, which thereby become a part of the realty . .
In South Dakota it is expressly provided by statute (Comp. Laws, Section
2771) that subterranean water, not flowing in a definite channel, but percolating
and seeping through the earth, is a part of the realty. The owner of land
upon which a percolating spring appears, being entitled to the waters thereof,
may recover damages from a person carrying them away. See Metcalf v.
Nelson (1895) 8 S. D. 87, 65 N. W. 911.
